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Discovery in Complex Litigation: The Dilemma
Faced by the Judiciary
I. INTRODUCTION
"Complex litigation"' is a term that is becoming increasingly fa-
miliar to the legal profession. 2 Complex litigation typically devel-
ops from situations involving mass torts arising from a single
disasterous event, such as an airline disaster.3 Complex cases also
may develop from antitrust violations, 4 securities violations,5 toxic
or defective products, 6 or consumer fraud.7  In these complex
cases, the victims usually are residents of various states. As a re-
sult, lawsuits emanating from a particular disaster may be scat-
tered among several federal and state courts.'
1. An advisory committee to the American Law Institute stated that "It]here is no
formally accepted definition of complex litigation. Arguably, these cases do not differ
significantly from other lawsuits, but merely are larger .... [T]he defining characteristic
of complex cases is their multiparty, multiforum nature." Preliminary Study of Complex
Litigation, A.L.I. Rep. 1, 4 (1987) [hereinafter Preliminary Study].
2. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation (An addendum to "Complex Civil
Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?"), 83 F.R.D. 497, 499 (1979) [hereinafter
Complex Civil Litigation].
3. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Denver, Colo., on Nov. 16, 1976, 486 F. Supp. 241
(J.P.M.D.L. 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 476 F.
Supp. 445 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport
on June 24, 1975, 407 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976).
For other examples of a single disasterous event from which complex cases have devel-
oped, see In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
988 (1982); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Bomb
Disaster at Roseville, Cal., on Apr. 28, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1400 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
4. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
dismissed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983).
5. See, e.g., In re Air West, Inc. Secs. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 609 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974); In
re Caesars Palace Secs. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
6. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y.
1983); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1171 (1983); In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 446 F. Supp. 244
(J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig.,
431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.D.L 1977).
7. See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Il1. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted,
456 U.S. 914, cerL dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
8. For example, a business entity that is responsible for a disaster that injures
thousands of people could be sued simultaneously in state courts where the claimants
reside, where the disaster occurred, where the defendant resides, and in federal courts in
diversity actions.
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Because the involvement of thousands of potential claimants and
multiple defendants often results in widespread litigation, proce-
dural complications frequently develop. 9 The judiciary, therefore,
must take an early and active role in managing and controlling this
type of litigation.'0 A particular problem facing members of the
judiciary in complex cases is the application of privilege."I Various
state and federal courts apply distinct privilege laws. 12 Because the
law of the forum will not always govern the application of privi-
lege,' 3 a judge must determine which privilege rule to follow when
actions arising from the same incident are pending in other
jurisdictions. 14
This Comment first will discuss how the privilege rules relate to
the scope of discovery in complex cases, focusing on the differences
between federal and Illinois law. Second, this Comment will ad-
dress the dilemma faced by the judiciary in determining which
privilege rule to apply. This Comment will conclude by recom-
mending the adoption of one uniform privilege rule for use in all
complex cases.
II. BACKGROUND OF PRIVILEGE IN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS
To avoid compliance with discovery requests, a litigant may
raise the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. 15
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege 6 is to promote full and
9. Preliminary Study, supra note 1, at 4-5.
10. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.1 (2d ed. 1985)(supplement to C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969-1985)).
11. "Privilege" used herein to encompass both work product and attorney-client
privilege.
12. See infra notes 23-57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-94 and accompanying text.
14. The issue of which privilege rule to apply has been described "as among the most
difficult questions a Federal judge [and, analogously, a state judge] can be called upon to
answer." Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 79 F.R.D. 72, 76 (D.P.R.
1978)(footnote omitted).
15. Sutherland & Deitrick, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine
in Federal and Illinois Courts, 73 ILL. BJ. 448 (1985) [hereinafter Sutherland &
Deitrick].
16. The attorney-client privilege covers confidential communications made by a client
to the attorney he has consulted for legal advice. Id. The privilege applies if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is act-
ing as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
1114 [Vol. 19
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frank disclosure by a client to enable the attorney to render effec-
tive advice.1 7 The purpose of the work product doctrine,' in con-
trast, is to protect an attorney's privacy and to promote
thoroughness in preparing for trial.19 The work product doctrine
gives an attorney a qualified immunity from disclosure; the exemp-
tion granted by the attorney-client privilege is absolute.20
The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine present
obstacles particularly in complex litigation involving corporations
which control a large amount of information. For instance, when
dealing with corporate clients, unique problems develop in deter-
mining whether the attorney-client privilege covers consultations
between particular officers and employees of the corporation and
corporate counsel.21 Moreover, the scope and coverage to which
each of these privileges may be extended differs significantly be-
tween Illinois courts and federal courts.22 How narrowly or
broadly the scope of these privileges is defined will determine the
amount of information that will be shielded from discovery.
A. The Work Product Exemption
The work product doctrine was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Hickman v. Taylor 23 and was codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 In Hickman, the Court
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of commit-
ting a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not
waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
17. Sutherland & Deitrick, supra note 15, at 448.
18. Commentators have recognized that work product embodies "opinion" work
product and "ordinary" work product. Id at 449. "Opinion" work product includes the
mental impressions, opinions, and legal theories of the attorney. Id. "Ordinary" work
product includes other factual material developed for trial. Id.
19. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
20. Sutherland & Deitrick, supra note 15, at 448.
21. Id.
22. For examples of the privilege law applied by other states, see infra notes 39 and
57.
23. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court defined the "work product of the lawyer" as
"interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, [and]
personal beliefs. . . ." Id. at 511.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) provides as follows:
(b) Scope of Discovery
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)
of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under subdivision (bX1) of this rule and prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
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fashioned a qualified immunity from discovery of an attorney's
work product. 25 The Court concluded that discovery may be taken
only if the material was "essential," "relevant," and "non-privi-
leged."' 26 The Court created this doctrine to protect the attorney's
work product from "undue and needless interference. ' 27 If work
product was discoverable, the Court reasoned, much of the attor-
ney's preparation would remain unwritten. 2 This would result in
inefficient and ineffective representation.29
According to Hickman, "opinion" work product is not discover-
able in federal court,3 0 except in rare situations a.3  Furthermore,
"ordinary" work product is immune from disclosure unless the re-
questing party can show both a "substantial need" for the material
and an inability "without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. 3 2
In Monier v. Chamberlain,33 the Illinois Supreme Court con-
structed parameters to the work product protection which were
narrower than those constructed by the United States Supreme
Court in Hickman. Although the Monier court maintained the ex-
clusion of "opinion" work product from discovery, it rejected the
exclusion of "ordinary" work product from discovery.3a The court
reasoned that the overriding concern favoring broad discovery was
the expediting of the "ascertainment of truth and ultimate disposi-
tion of the lawsuit. ' 35  It rejected the requirement of showing
insurer, or agent) only upon showing that the party seeking discovery has sub-
stantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required show-
ing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
Id.
25. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Sutherland & Deitrick, supra note 15, at 449.
31. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513. The Court in Hickman did not explicitly define what
might constitute such a "rare situation justifying production of these matters . . . ." Id.
Rather, it merely stated that "petitioner's case is not of that type." Id.
32. Sutherland & Deitrick, supra note 15, at 449. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
33. 35 11. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
34. Id. at 361, 221 N.E.2d at 417. The court distinguished between "conceptual
data" reflecting the "attorney's 'mental processes,'" which would be exempt from discov-
ery, and other "relevant and material" factual matter, which would be discoverable. Id.
at 360, 221 N.E.2d at 416.
35. Id. at 361, 221 N.E.2d at 417.
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"good cause" before allowing discovery of such material in order
to "avoid the need for judicial intervention at the discovery
stage." 36
Subsequently, the work product exemption enunciated in Monier
was codified in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201. 3" Thus, in Illi-
nois, "ordinary" work product is discoverable;3 "opinion" work
product is discoverable only in rare circumstances.39
36. Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 27
(1982).
37. ILL. S. CT. R. 201, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 201 (1985). Rule 201 states
in pertinent part:
(b) Scope of Discovery
(2) Privilege and Work Product. All matters that are privileged against disclo-
sure on the trial, including privileged communications between a party or his
agent and the attorney for the party, are privileged against disclosure through
any discovery procedure. Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for
trial is subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories,
mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney. The court may
apportion the cost involved in originally securing the discoverable material, in-
cluding when appropriate a reasonable attorney's fee, in such manner as is just.
Id.
38. Sutherland & Deitrick, supra note 15, at 457.
39. In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Il. 2d 103, 110-11, 432
N.E.2d 250, 253 (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that sometimes the only source
of factual data may be blended together with "opinion" work product in such a way that
it is impossible to separate the two. Notes or memoranda that provide the only source of
factual material will not be shielded from discovery by the work product doctrine. Id.
The courts of other states also have taken different approaches to the application of the
work product doctrine. For example, the Wisconsin courts have set forth a definition of
work product which is similar to that set forth by the courts of Illinois. In Wisconsin,
work product encompasses material the attorney has compiled and the "mental impres-
sions, the legal theories and strategies that he has pursued or adopted as derived from
interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, legal and factual research,
mental impressions, personal beliefs and other tangible or intangible means." State ex rel.
Dudek v. Circuit Ct., 34 Wis. 2d 559, 589, 150 N.W.2d 387, 404 (1967). In application,
however, the Wisconsin privilege extends much further than that of Illinois. In Wiscon-
sin, the work product privilege will shield most material prepared by an attorney for
litigation. Id. The privilege is not limited to the attorney's subjective theories and mental
processes. Id. Furthermore, material that has become a part of his file may be privileged
even if he has not prepared it himself. State ex rel. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Circuit Ct.,
67 Wis. 2d 469, 475, 228 N.W.2d 161, 164 (1975). Because Wisconsin's privilege law
covers more material than does Illinois law, material that falls within Wisconsin's work
product privilege may nevertheless be discoverable under Illinois law.
The California courts grant a qualified privilege against the discovery of "ordinary"
work product. American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 38 Cal. App. 3d 579,
594, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 573 (1974). "Opinion" work product, however, is immunized
absolutely. Id. An attorney's ordinary work product is not discoverable unless it would
"unfairly prejudice" the other party, whereas opinion work product is not discoverable
under any circumstances. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 2016(b) (West 1983) (emphasis
added).
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B. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Courts typically have applied one of two tests in determining the
scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. 40
The two tests applied are the "control group'! test and the "subject
matter" test.41 Under the control group test, only communications
between corporate counsel and top corporate managers are privi-
leged.42 In contrast, the "subject matter" or "scope of employ-
ment" test focuses the attention on the reasons why an attorney
was consulted rather than on the persons with whom the attorney
communicated.43
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,44 the United States Supreme
Court rejected the control group test. The Upjohn case involved a
request for discovery of documents prepared by Upjohn foreign
managers for General Counsel.45 The Court ruled that the attor-
ney-client privilege protected these communications from discov-
ery.46 It reasoned that, not only was the control group test difficult
40. Sutherland & Deitrick, supra note 15, at 448. Because courts have not consist-
ently applied one test for determining the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate context, unique problems develop in complex litigation in which corporations
are usually the defending party. The discussion of the attorney-client privilege, therefore,
is limited to the corporate setting.
41. Id.
42. Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: The Intersection of
Federal and Illinois Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 189 (1984). The control group test
was enunciated first by the court in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210
F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The court stated as follows:
[11f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in
a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he
is an authorized member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
lawyer and the privilege would apply. In all other cases the employee would be
merely giving information to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in
the corporation having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice.
Id. at 485.
43. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). The Seventh Circuit defined the subject
matter test as follows:
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is
sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the
corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communica-
tion at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject
matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt
with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of
his employment.
Id. at 491-92.
44. 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
45. Id. at 386-87.
46. Id. at 392.
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to apply, but also, it discouraged corporate employees from divulg-
ing relevant information to corporate counsel.47 The Court, how-
ever, did not create a standard to replace the test .4  Rather, the
decision of whether the privilege is applicable would be made on a
case-by-case basis. 49
In Illinois courts, however, the control group test will be ap-
plied. That test was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Con-
solidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co..5° That case involved the
discoverability of both a report by a Bucyrus-Erie employee, and
certain notes and memoranda of in-house counsel.5' Although the
court recognized the importance of encouraging full and frank dis-
closure between client and attorney,5 2 it noted that, in the corpo-
rate setting, the attorney-client privilege potentially could shield
extensive amounts of relevant and material information from dis-
covery. 3a To make the attorney-client privilege more compatible
with the Illinois policy favoring broad discovery, the court applied
47. Id.
48. Id. at 386.
49. Id. As a result, "[t]he question of who speaks for a corporation on a privileged
basis has created considerable confusion and conflict in the Federal system ....." Consoli-
dation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus.Erie Co., 89 11. 2d 103, 112, 432 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1982). See
also Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: The Intersection of
Federal and Illinois Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 176 n.5 (1984); Consolidation Coal,
89 Il1. 2d at 113-17, 432 N.E.2d at 255-56, for the different tests applied by federal courts
in determining whether communications between an attorney and corporate client are
privileged.
50. 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982). In Illinois, the parameters of the control
group test were set forth in Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Il. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802
(5th Dist. 1964). An employee is a member of the control group if he "is in a position to
control or take a part in a decision about any action the corporation might take upon the
advice of its attorney, he personifies the corporation and when he makes reports or gives
information to the attorney, the attorney-client privilege applies." Id. at 58, 199 N.E.2d
at 806. Furthermore, in Golminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Constr. Co., 112 I1. App. 2d 445,
251 N.E.2d 314 (1st Dist. 1969), the court refused to adopt a broad application of the
attorney-client privilege for corporate clients. It recognized that the attorney-client privi-
lege should not "encompass all communications made to the attorney representing the
corporation by any employee regardless of his rank or corporate responsibilities and du-
ties." Id. at 448, 251 N.E.2d at 317. See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers
Co., 138 Il. App. 3d 276, 280, 485 N.E.2d 1301, 1304 (1st Dist. 1985) (corporation's
senior product engineer not within corporate control group because he merely supplied
information to top management who ultimately made the decision); Shere v. Marshall
Field & Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 728, 732, 327 N.E.2d 92, 95 (1st Dist. 1975) (director of
safety of corporate owner of store was not within corporate control group because he did
not have any "actual authority to participate in a decision regarding what action the
corporation might take upon the advice of its attorney.").
51. Consolidation Coal 89 11. 2d at 107, 432 N.E.2d at 251.
52. Id. at 117-18, 432 N.E.2d at 256.
53. Id. at 118, 432 N.E.2d at 256-57.
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the control group test.5 4
The court emphasized that the test "[struck] a reasonable bal-
ance by protecting consultations with counsel by those who are the
decisionmakers or who substantially influence corporate decisions
and... minimiz[ed] the amount of relevant factual material which
[was] immune from discovery." 5 The goal, according to the court,
was to prevent the concealment of relevant and material informa-
tion in the corporate structure, and to retain a reasonable applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege among the participants in the
actual decision-making within the corporation. 6
Thus, privilege law in Illinois courts and in federal courts differs
significantly.7 In Illinois, the scope of the work product doctrine
is narrow. The work product doctrine applied by federal courts is
more expansive and shields more material from discovery. Fur-
ther, in the corporate setting, Illinois courts apply the attorney-
client privilege only to the "control group." The control group test
will not be applied, however, in a federal court which is adjudicat-
ing issues of federal law.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE DILEMMA FACED BY THE JUDICIARY
The existence of substantially different discovery practices in Il-
linois courts, other state courts, and federal courts presents signifi-
cant problems when complex litigation is pending in multiple
jurisdictions. When complex cases are pending simultaneously in
various federal and state courts, corporations usually are parties to
the action. 8 A corporation defending itself simultaneously in sev-
54. Id. at 118-20, 432 N.E.2d at 256-58.
55. Id. at 118-19, 432 N.E.2d at 257.
56. Id.
57. Other states also have taken different approaches. Seven states have incorporated
the control group test into their rules of evidence: Alaska, Arkansas, Maine, Nevada,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Stern, Attorney-Client Privilege: Supreme
Court Repudiates the Control Group Test, 67 A.B.A. J. 1142, 1144 n.4 (1981). See also
D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 60 Cal. 2d 723, 737, 388 P.2d 700, 709, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 477 (1964), in which the California Supreme Court rejected the control group
test and held that the privilege would apply when "the communicating employee is such a
person who would ordinarily be utilized for communicating to the corporation's attor-
ney" or "[w]here the employee's connection with the matter grows out of his employment
to the extent that his report or statement is required in the ordinary course of the corpo-
ration's business .... ." See also Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. ABC
Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) (federal district court applying the law
of that state did not follow the control group test). States that have omitted the control
group test from codifications of their rules of evidence include Arizona, California, Flor-
ida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, and New Mexico.
Stern. supra, at 1 14. n.5.
58. For example, a toxic disaster or mass tort involving a defective product produced
1120 [Vol. 19
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eral jurisdictions potentially will face varying and inconsistent
privilege rules that may force it to disclose material in one jurisdic-
tion that may be privileged in another. Because of the diversity in
state and federal privilege law, corporate attorneys may find it diffi-
cult to determine when communications will be privileged.
The law of the forum will not always govern the application of
privilege.5 9 Because cases arising from the same incident will be
pending in several fora, a judge will face the dilemma of deciding
which forum's policy regarding privilege to apply. 6°
by a single corporation may transcend the boundaries of several states. See, e.g., In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893
(N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983) (by 1981, approximately 1,573 suits were pending against A.H. Robins); In re
Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906, 907-08
(J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (Johns-Manville was a defendant in ninety-one actions pending in
nineteen districts and in seventy-three state court actions; seven other defendant corpora-
tions were named in more than fifty actions.).
59. For a discussion of the difficulty in determining which forum's law will apply in
complex cases, see infra notes 61-94 and accompanying text.
60. In complex cases, a judge may also face a dilemma regarding the proper disposi-
tion of material prepared for terminated litigation or for claims that did not result in
litigation. The extent of protection from discovery that this material should be given and
whether the work product or attorney-client privilege should be applied to it is a divisive
issue among the courts.
One approach courts have taken is that when material prepared for prior litigation has
been determined to fall within the attorney's work product, it will be shielded from dis-
covery in all subsequent cases. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
945 (1977); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th
Cir. 1973); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1967);
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 516 (D. Conn. 1976), appeal dismissed, 534
F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. O.K. Tire & Rubber Co., 71 F.R.D. 465 (D.
Idaho 1976); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. 11. 1970); Fellows v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal.
App. 3d 55, 166 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1980); Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior
Ct., 107 Cal. App. 3d 496, 502, 165 Cal. Rptr. 748, 752 (1980); Willis v. Duke Power Co.,
291 N.C. 19, 35-36, 229 S.E.2d 191, 201 (1976). The policy behind maintaining the privi-
lege for subsequent suits is that, if a party to a subsequent suit may compel discovery of
an attorney's work product from prior litigation, an attorney will hesitate to accurately
and thoroughly record his full impressions or doubts about a case.
Another approach taken by various courts is that when the prior and subsequent cases
are related closely regarding the issues or parties, the materials prepared for the prior
litigation will remain privileged. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp.
136, 153 (D. Del. 1977); Midland Inv. Co. v. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 59 F.R.D. 134,
138 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Insurance Co. or N. America v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 F.R.D.
520, 522-23 (D. Colo. 1964); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 716 (Del. Ch.
1976).
Under certain circumstances, howuvci, courts h ." ref'iqed to apply the work product
piiviicg tu material prepared for, terminated litigation. See, e.g., National Steel Prods.
Co. v. Superior Ct., 164 Cal. App. 3d 476, 492, 210 Cal. Rptr. 535, 545 (1985); Shepherd
v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 107, 122, 550 P.2d 161, 169, 130 Cul. Rptr. 257, 265 (1976).
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A. The Procedural-Substantive Dichotomy
Because rules of discovery typically are viewed as procedural,
the forum will apply its own rules governing the scope of discov-
ery.6 Although the forum generally will follow its own rules gov-
erning procedure,62 the forum law will not always govern in
substantive conflicts.63 Privilege law is treated differently from
general rules of discovery, 64 and there is a divergence of views as to
Material prepared for prior litigation that is only remotely related to a subsequent case
may be discoverable. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117,
119 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D.
534, 537 (D. Del. 1954); cf. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 66
F.R.D. 154, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (material would be discoverable even if the cases in-
volved "substantially identical issues"). In fact, courts have held that material prepared
for terminated litigation may also be discoverable if it is at issue in the subsequent case.
See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129, 134 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
Material that previously has been shielded from discovery as work product in the prior
litigation, however, should not be discoverable in a subsequent action. 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 200-01 (1970). Material
should not lose its status as "privileged" just because the prior litigation has been termi-
nated, particularly because a court has already determined that the interest in shielding
that material from disclosure outweighed the considerations favoring disclosure to the
public. Allowing this information to be discoverable at a later date would not only defeat
the purpose of granting the privilege, but also would undermine the policy of the particu-
lar jurisdiction in granting the privilege. Furthermore, it would discourage attorneys
from fully committing their thoughts and legal theories about a case to paper. Precluding
disclosure of such material is especially imperative in closely related cases in which the
same interests and similar issues are involved.
Even if the subsequent action is unrelated, an attorney's work product could end up
indirectly in the hands of those representing antagonistic interests. "[A] sufficient com-
munity of interest may exist among attorneys ... in a given locality so that disclosure to
one is disclosure to all." Note, The Attorney's Trial Preparations and Pre-Trial Discovery
Under the Federal Rules: Hickman v. Taylor Two Years After, 62 HARV. L. REV. 269,
274 (1948). Certain corporations frequently may be defendants. In complex cases, in
which substantial investigation into the corporation's business may be compelled, mate-
rial may prove useful to an adversary in an unrelated case.
The threat that certain material potentially could be revealed in some subsequent cases
but not in others would diminish a lawyer's expectations of pwivacy. Thus, precluding
discovery of work product in subsequent cases would provide the certainty and predict-
ability necessary to allow the work product doctrine to be utilized effectively and fairly.
61. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1985).
62. People v. Saiken, 49 I11. 2d 504, 509, 275 N.E.2d 381, 385 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1066 (1972) ("[tlraditional conflict principles prescribe that issues of clearly
procedural nature are governed by the internal laws of the forum . . ").
63. See, e.g., Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1311 (3d
Cir. 1978); Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 91-92 (1st Cir. 1975);
Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 79 F.R.D. 72, 78 (D.P.R. 1978); In
rt Wcstinghous. Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 76 F.R.D. 47, 54 (W.D. Pa.
1977).
64. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws recognizes that the law of the
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whether privilege law is procedural or substantive.65 If privilege is
procedural, then the law of the forum will be applied. If it is sub-
stantive, then a choice of law problem may arise regarding the
competing interests of the jurisdictions involved."
Various courts have held that privileges are not substantive in
nature, but rather, are procedural rules of evidence. 67 In McDon-
ald's Corp. v. Levine,68 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District stated that "[t]he attorney-client privilege is a rule of evi-
dence, not a substantive right." In Consolidation Coal, however,
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District refused to label
the privilege as substantive or procedural, and analyzed the case
under both scenarios.69
Difficulties a1' a arise in federal court in determining which privi-
lege law is to -,e applied in complex cases. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 50170 authorizes federal courts to apply state privilege law in
forum will not always apply to privileged communications. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 138 (1971).
65. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
66. Sie infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
67. See Hesselbine v. Wedel, 44 F.R.D. 431, 433 (W.D. Okla. 1968)("IT]he scope of
the asserted privilege is that of the law of evidence."); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H.
758, 764, 408 A.2d 121, 125 (1979) ("The attorney-client privilege is considered an evi-
dentiary one, not a matter of substantive law."); Mileski v. Locker, 14 Misc. 2d 252, 255,
178 N.Y.S.2d 911, 915 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) ("The principle that certain relations are
confidential and certain communications privileged against disclosure is a rule of evi-
dence, based upon public policy." See also 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 252 (1957) ("[The] rule
of privileged communications is not a rule of substantive law, but a mere rule of
evidence ....").
68. 108 I1. App. 3d 732, 744, 439 N.E.2d 475, 484 (2d Dist. 1982).
69. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 93 Il1. App. 3d 35, 39-40, 416
N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (1st Dist. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d
250 (1982). The material was held to be discoverable under either standard, and, accord-
ingly the court did not need to resolve the issue of whether the privilege was procedural
or substantive. The court stated that "[i]f work product is considered a procedural issue,
the forum law would apply. Were we to adopt.. . the most significant relationship test
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws... the forum law again would
control." Id.
70. FED. R. EvID. 501. Rule 501 states that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may by interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of
reason and experience. Howevet, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
tJ an elemcnit of a clttim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political sub-
division thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
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diversity cases. 71 The Rule does not specify, however, which
state's substantive law is to apply to the controversy.72 In addition,
in cases involving both federal and state issues, information may be
privileged to one but not the other. Rule 501 requires federal
courts to apply federal privilege law to federal claims and state law
to the state claims." Indeed, the communication may be relevant
to both claims but will be disclosed under one body of law and
privileged under another. As a result, neither federal courts nor
state courts have a consistent and predictable guide to follow in
applying privilege law in complex cases.
B. The Choice of Law Problem
1. The Restatement's "Most Significant Relationship" Test
The Restateme .t (Second) of Conflict of Laws offers a solution
to the judiciary's predicament of deciding which privilege law to
apply in complex cases.74 It stresses that evidence which is not
privileged under the law of the state which has the "most signifi-
cant relationship" 7 with the transaction or communication will be
admitted, even though it would be inadmissible under the forum's
local law.76 This rule is designed to support the expectations of the
parties because if the parties were to rely on any law at all, they
most likely would rely on the law of the state that has the most
significant relationship with the communication.77
Evidence which is not privileged under the local law of the fo-
rum, but nevertheless is privileged under the law of the state which
has the "most significant relationship" with the communication
usually also will be admitted. 78  Because each forum state will
strive to reach the proper result in its domestic litigation, each state
generally will have "a strong policy favoring disclosure of all rele-
71. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 76 F.R.D. 47,
53 (W.D. Pa. 1977) ("It is thus clear that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the
state law of privilege.").
72. The Committee comments also fail to give any indication of which state's law to
apply.
73. FED. R. EvID. 501.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1971) [hereinafter
Restatement].
75. The state with the "most significant relationship" is typically that in which the
communication took place or where the prior relationship between the parties was cen-
tered. Id. at comment (e). See, e.g., Hill v. Huddleston, 263 F. Supp. 108 (D. Md. 1967).
76. Restatement, supra note 74.
77. Restatement, supra note 74, at comment on subsection (1).
78. Restatement, supra note 74.
(V/ol. 191124
1988] Discovery in Complex Litigation 1125
vant facts that are not privileged under its own local law."79
The Restatement, therefore, endorses a policy in favor of admit-
ting allegedly privileged material. This section directs the forum to
admit the evidence in the absence of "strong public policy"80 or
"some special reason"'" to the contrary.82
2. The "Interest Analysis" Test
Interest analysis methodology is another approach which courts
have used to resolve conflict of law problems in the area of privi-
leges.8 3 This approach takes into account not only the interests of
the state in which the communication occurred and of the forum
state, but also, it considers the interests of both the parties involved
and the deposition state.84
When confronted with conflict of law problems in privileged
communications, the court considers four factors under the inter-
est analysis test. First, the court must give weight to the policy of
the forum state where the communication occurred and the rela-
tion of the parties to that state.8 5 Second, the court must examine
the public policies underlying the particular privilege.86 Third, the
interest in the situs state in maintaining the privilege must be con-
sidered.8 7  Finally, the court must consider the forum state's
79. Id., comment on subsection (2).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIT OF LAWS § 139(2) (1971).
82. The factors to be considered in determining whether the information will remain
privileged or not include:
(1) the number and nature of the contacts that the state of the forum has with
the parties and with the transaction involved, (2) the relative materiality of the
evidence that is sought to be excluded, (3) the kind of privilege involved and (4)
fairness to the parties.... If the contacts with the state of the forum are numer-
ous and important, the forum will be more reluctant to give effect to the foreign
privilege .... Tlhe forum will take such steps as may be necessary to prevent a
party to the action from taking an inequitable advantage of the privilege.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139, comment on subsection (2)
(1971).
83. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 161, 583
P.2d 721, 723, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1978); Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc.,
518 F.2d 89, 91-92 (1st Cir. 1975); Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth.,
79 F.R.D. 72, 78 (D.P.R. 1978); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 76 F.R.D. 47, 54 (W.D. Pa. 1977); cf. Melville v. American Home Assurance Co.,
584 F.2d 1306, 1311 (3d Cir. 1978) (adopting "a flexible methodology" combining the
approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws with the interest analy-
sis approach).
84. Mitsui, 79 F.R.D. at 78.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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interest in preserving the confidentiality of the out-of-state
communication."'
The forum should apply the law of the state which will most
significantly promote the interests and policies of the involved
states and litigants. Typically, the state whose law will determine
whether the communication will be privileged will be that state in
which the parties allegedly entered the privileged relationship. 9
Legal scholars examining the problem from an "interests" ap-
proach have argued that, generally, the law of the forum should be
applied when the forum has a policy interest in maintaining its own
law. One scholar suggested analyzing conflict-of-law problems on
a case-by-case basis; thus, the forum's law would be displaced only
when its use would defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties
or particularly violate the interests of the other jurisdiction.90 Jus-
tice Traynor, however, recommended interpreting the policy be-
hind the state's own statutory law to see if it was intended to be
applied to interstate situations.91 In cases in which it cannot be
determined whether the particular law was intended to apply to
interstate situations, he would "invoke the aid of such tests as
which state has the most substantial connection with the issue, 92
the five principles of Leflar93 . . . and any other principle" that
would aid in making the determination. 94 As a result of such anal-
88. Id.
89. The theory behind this test is that "[a] state's decision to extend (or withhold) a
privilege with regard to a relationship exclusively within that state should not be disre-
garded by any other state, whether forum or deposition state." Seidelson, The Federal
Rules of Evidence: Rule 501, Klaxon and the Constitution, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 21, 33-34
(1976).
The application of the law of a state other than the one in which the privileged commu-
nication exclusively existed "would frustrate (1) the potential expectations of the parties
to the relationship, (2) the interest of the situs state in regulating the relationship and (3)
the political capacity of citizens of the situs state to determine the nature of the relation-
ship in that state." Id. at 34.
90. See Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEX.
L. REV. 211, 224 (1971) [hereinafter Round Table] (comments of Professor Robert A.
Sedler, University of Kentucky).
9 1. Round Table, supra note 90, at 240 (comments of Roger J. Traynor, Chief Justice
of California, retired).
92. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
93. Professor Leflar compiled lists prepared by other scholars of policy factors that
affect choice-of-law determinations and developed considerations that he believed re-
flected pertinent policy factors: "A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate
and international order; C. Simplification of the judicial task; D. Advancement of the
forum's governmental interests; E. Application of the better rule of law." Kay, Theory
into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521, 563 (1983).
94. Round Table, supra note 90, at 240. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 6 (1971). The Restatement provides as follows:
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ysis, substantial deference is given to a broad application of the
local law of the forum.
The determination of the appropriate privilege law to be applied
is thus one of the most difficult decisions a judge will face. The
judge must weigh not only the interests of the parties in disclosure
or non-disclosure, but also the relevant policies of the interested
fora involved. Hence, issues of fairness, predictability, and uni-
formity all become intertwined in the judge's decision-making
process.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF PRIVILEGE
IN ALL COMPLEX CASES
Although several tests have been applied to help resolve conflicts
over privilege laws, each state nevertheless maintains a strong in-
terest in applying its own law.95 For instance, in Illinois, the
judge's decision will probably be influenced by the policy favoring
broad discovery. The Monier decision, which laid the groundwork
for current discovery policy in Illinois, emphasized the strong in-
terest Illinois has in maintaining wide discovery.96 With compet-
ing interests involved, the tests applied by the courts will not solve
the problem of conflicting rules of privilege being applied in com-
plex litigation.
Even though a particular jurisdiction may apply the "most sig-
nificant relationship" test and ultimately determine that another
state has the most significant relationship, it nevertheless may un-
dermine that other state's policy by deciding that its own interests
Choice of Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory direc-
tive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id.
95. See, e.g., Application of Walsh, 40 Misc. 2d 413, 413, 243 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (involving a deposition to be taken in New York for use in an action
pending in Connecticut. Because New York law granted a privilege, the court held that
applying Connecticut law which required production would violate the public policy be-
hind its privilege).
96. 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
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outweigh those of that state.97 Thus, notions of comity and full
faith and credit may be overridden by a state's interest in maintain-
ing its own policy.
A viable, yet difficult, solution to this problem would be to coor-
dinate a joint discovery plan between the various courts involved
on the federal and state level. This approach seeks to establish one
flexible rule, which is easy to follow, and which will produce uni-
form results in complex cases. Indeed, Congress can provide the
leadership by passing one uniform rule for federal courts to follow
in all cases.9 The state courts then may follow by adopting a uni-
form rule that can be applied consistently.
The American Law Institute ("ALI") must provide the impetus
for a new rule. In 1985, the ALI appointed a committee to ex-
amine the problems associated with complex litigation and to make
recommendations.99 The committee recommended that the ALI
create a federal choice-of-law rule for purposes of selecting a single
law to govern complex cases.'°°
97. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 93 Ill. App. 3d 35, 416
N.E.2d 1090 (1st Dist. 1980), supra note 69 and accompanying text. In that case, the
court had to decide whether to apply the privilege law of Wisconsin (the location of the
defendant's principal place of business) or that of Illinois (where the accident occurred).
Id. at 39, 416 N.E.2d at 1093. It ruled that Illinois law governing work product was to be
applied. Id. at 40, 416 N.E.2d at 1094. The court concluded that although Wisconsin
had the "most significant relationship," its considerations did not outweigh the Illinois
policy favoring broad discovery. Id. See also Hare v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 334
F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1971) (court refused to apply the law of the state with the most
significant relationship when comity to the sister state which required disclosure would
violate its own public policy of maintaining the privilege).
98. See, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: The Intersec-
tion of Federal and Illinois Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 175 (1984) (arguing for one uni-
form, codified federal privilege rule to be applied by federal courts in all cases).
99. Distinguished judges, lawyers, and academians were appointed to serve on the
Advisory Committee. Arthur R. Miller, Bruce D. Bromley Professor of Law at Harvard
Law School, served as the Reporter for the study. This committee expressed its concerns
over the inadequacy of existing mechanisms to resolve issues arising in complex cases.
[A]s society grows increasingly dependent upon mass enterprises and poten-
tially dangerous technologies and products, the incidence of highly complex
lawsuits is likely to continue to increase and thereby pose an even greater threat
to the viability of our system. Currently existing mechanisms for consolidating,
coordinating, and resolving related actions were designed in a different age, and
for much simpler litigation; they simply are not adequate for many of today's
problems. The development of effective procedures for handling complex litiga-
tion therefore may be necessary if a crisis in the courts is to be averted.
Preliminary Study, supra note 1, at 5.
100. Preliminary Study, supra note 1, at 239. Specifically, the Committee recom-
mended that the A.L.I.:
Study the possibility of establishing a federal choice of law rule that would
make possible the selection of a unitary governing law, or a manageable number
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In addition to the committee's recommendation, the ALI also
should create a uniform privilege rule to be applied when a com-
plex case is pending in two or more states (or in a state and federal
court) and the potential for the application of conflicting privilege
rules is created. Although each state has a valid interest in not
compelling disclosure of the contents of relationships it has deemed
to be privileged, complex litigation is an exceptional situation. Be-
cause so much is at stake in complex litigation, and because vast
amounts of information are involved, there is great potential for
abuse of privileges. An expansive privilege rule could lead to the
shielding of extensive amounts of relevant and material informa-
tion from discovery. Accordingly, a new rule should favor a nar-
row application of privilege so as to not unduly limit disclosure in
these situations.'0 1
of different laws, to apply to common questions in a consolidated multiparty,
multiforum case by either;
(a) determining governing law in consolidated actions; or
(b) authorizing the development of a federal common law of choice of law in
complex multiparty, multiforum cases.
Id.
101. It is generally recognized that the privilege is an exception to the general duty to
disclose. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). There-
fore, "[it ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the logic of its principle." Id. In fact, the Supreme Court recognized that rules of
discovery
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-
honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into
the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge Uf all rL!evant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (footnote omitted).
The advantages of liberal discovery 4nclude the reduction of surprise at trial, the facili-
tation of trial preparation, the encouragement of settlement, the narrowing and simplifi-
cation of issues, and the introduction of new issues. 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, & G.
GROTHEER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 26.02[21 (2d ed. 1987). By fully informing
the parties of the validity of their claims and defenses, a just and effective determination
of the issues is promoted.
Furthermore, there are procedural safeguards in place to protect against abuses and
thus mitigate the inconvenience and unfairness that would support the argument for ap-
plying a broad privilege standard. For example, see Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201
which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(c) Prevention of Abuse
(1) Protective Orders. The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on
motion of any party or witness, make a protective order as justice requires,
denying, limiting, conditioning, or regulating discovery to prevent unreasonable
annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression.
(2) Supervision of discovery. Upon the motion of any party or witness, on
notice to all parties, or on its own initiative without notice, the court may super-
vise all or any part of any discovery procedure.
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The Illinois approach, in this respect, presents a favorable model
for the uniform privilege law. 0 2 The narrow scope of work prod-
uct fashioned by Monier and codified in Supreme Court Rule 201 is
aimed at facilitating the acquisition of all relevant information to
expedite the "ultimate dispo.-iuon of the lawsuit."' 03 Relevant and
material evidence that might otherwise be privileged will be re-
leased to fully "educat[e] the parties in advance of trial as to the
real value of their claims and defenses ... ;"104 thereby encourag-
ing the early resolution of disputes and settlement.10 5 This is par-
ticularly critical in complex cases because of the potential for time
consuming litigation that clogs the court systems, and drains the
parties of astronomical sums of money and other resources.106
Similarly, in the attorney-client privilege context, the control
group test adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Consolidation
Coal provides a favorable model to be followed in all complex
cases. The control group test reduces the ability of the corporation
to insulate large amounts of information from discovery. 0 7 Fur-
ILL. S. CT. R. 201, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 201 (1985). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
26(c) (Rule 26(c) governs protective orders in federal courts).
102. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
103. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 I1. 2d 351, 361, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1966).
104. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Il. 2d 231, 236, 145 N.E.2d 588,
592 (1957)).
105. Monier, 35 Il1. 2d at 357, 221 N.E.2d at 415.
106. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 513 F. Supp. 1100
(E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 475
U.S. 574 (1986). That case was filed in 1974 against twenty-two Japanese manufacturers
of consumer electronic products and two American companies. The case was transferred
to the Pennsylvania court after two of the previous judges assigned to the case had died
before any substantial progress was made. Matsushita, 723 F.2d at 250 n.l. Discovery
lasted several years, and "[t]he clerk inform[ed] us that from January 1, 1980 to October
1, 1980, the parties filed some 114 briefs or memoranda, two of which (filed by plaintiffs)
were roughly five hundred pages in length. We have not counted, but estimate the total
brief pages alone filed during 1980 to be in excess of 7500." Matsushita, 513 F. Supp. at
1118 n.2. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the judicial resources ex-
hausted by the case:
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages; the
primary opinion of the District Court is more than three times as long. Two
respected District Judges each have authored a number of opinions in this case;
the published ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement.
In addition, the parties have filed a forty-volume appendix in this Court that is
said to contain the essence of the evidence on which the District Court and the
Court of Appeals based their respective decisions.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
107. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE
L.J. 953, 955-56 (1956) ("Where corporations are involved, with their large number of
agents, masses of documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence
grows large."). See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 118,
432 N.E.2d 250, 257 (1982), in which the court stated that the "potential to insulate so
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thermore, the control group test is predictable and easy to apply. 08
The case-by-case approach adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Upjohn requires the judiciary to independently review
each assertion of the attorney-client privilege. The already over-
crowded court dockets would be delayed further due to pretrial
hearings, interlocutory appeals, or mandamus actions on the as-
serted privilege.
As federal and state courts continue to take such different ap-
proaches, attorneys face uncertainty as to when communications
are privileged. Corporations doing business in various states are
subjected to several different privilege laws. As a result, determin-
ing when a communication is privileged becomes difficult, if not
impossible. This difficulty could have a tremendously chilling ef-
fect on full and frank communications between attorney and client.
There is a need, therefore, for one uniform rule in complex cases. I09
Although each state arguably has a significant interest in maintain-
ing its own privilege law, without a uniform rule, each state's privi-
lege law stands to be frustrated and undermined by other states.
V. CONCLUSION
In Illinois, privilege rules are applied very narrowly to facilitate
the policy of broad discovery. In federal court and the courts of
other states, however, privilege law may shield more material from
discovery. As a result, parties involved in complex cases may be
forced to disclose information in one jurisdiction that is immune
from discovery in another.
much material from the truth-seeking process convinces us that the privilege ought to be
limited for the corporate client to the extent reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose."
108. Consolidation Coal, 89 11. 2d at 119, 432 N.E.2d at 257.
109. Another recommendation set forth by the Advisory Committet; to the A.L.I. is
to "[clonsider means of increasing the consolidation of related cases dispersid among the
federal courts for common adjudication, perhaps by: (a) expanding transfer under Sec-
tion 1407 to include trial as well as pretrial" or "[e]valuate the possibility of encouraging
the consolidation of related actions dispersed among state courts as well as federal courts
in a single federal or state court . . . ." Preliminary Study, supra note 1, at 238-39.
Section 1407 authorizes the "judicial panel on multi-district litigation" to transfer "civil
actions involving one or more common questions of fact... pending in different districts,
... to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a) (1982). Although the creation of a forum to consolidate complex cases for trial
has the advantages of saving time, reducing litigation costs, preventing duplication, and
avoiding conflicting rulings, it is not preferable to the proposed adoption of one uniform
privilege rule. Due to the substantial number of potential claimants involved, the interest
in choosing their own forum, and the hardship of forcing them to travel (along with
witnesses and evidentiary matter) to a foreign forum, reason and fairness dictates that
having each forum apply a uniform privilege rule is preferable.
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Because of the direct conflict of privilege law between various
state and federal courts, there is a need for the adoption of a uni-
form privilege rule to be applied in all complex cases. Without a
uniform rule, attorneys will face uncertainty as to when communi-
cations will be privileged. As a result, the ultimate goal of encour-
aging full disclosure between attorney and client is undermined,
and the attorney-client privilege is frustrated. Communications be-
tween attorney and client will be chilled by the threat of public
disclosure in another jurisdiction. The American Law Institute,
therefore, must present a uniform privilege rule for adoption by the
states to be applied by all courts involved in complex cases pending
in two or more jurisdictions.
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